Military History

Ernest is listed as being killed in action on 9 Oct 1917 during the Battle of Poelcappelle. The 1st/4th Battalion war diary entry for the day is the following report on operations.

1/4^th Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment
Report of Operations on 9^th October 1917 & Subsequently

Reference Map Poelcappelle Ed.4 1/10,000

1.            The plan for moving the Battalion [Bn] to the jumping-off position was as follows:-

The Second-in-Command went on an hour in advance of the Battalion with 3 N.C.O’s per Company [Coy], this party was to lay out the tape lines 50 yards and 200 yards respectively being Country Cross Roads and then to return to Tweed House to guide the Battalion in. The Battalion was to move up by the Alberta Track and then along the Poelcappelle Road to V.30.d.63.80 where they were to have been met by Bucks Battalion guides who would guide them to Tweed House by the taped track via Bavaroise House.

On arrival at V.30.d.63.80 Lt-Col Crosskey found that the guides were not there and after waiting for a time decided that he would turn about and move up via the Trench board track and Hubner Farm a route which he knew himself to some extent. This he did and arrived at Tweed House about 1.45am but then discovered that the three rear Coy’s and about one platoon of the lead Coy had lost touch, Bn HQ runners were sent out to look for the missing Coys and C Coy, the leading Coy was guided down to the jumping-off point.

At about 4.30am A, B & 2 platoons of D Coy were brought to Tweed House and were taken on down to the jumping-off point. These Coys were just forming up along the tape when our barrage came down, so the Bn started the attack less 2 platoons of D Coy and a few men from A & C. B coy was complete.

2.            The leading Coys, A on the right and D on the left, started off at once and got to within 50 yards of the barrage before the first lift. B & C Coys, B of the right & C on the left moved forward a few minutes after A & D Coys. At the first lift the barrage was lost and owing to the sodden condition of the ground was never caught up again.  Immediately the advance commenced our men came under Machine Gun fire from the Cemetery in V.26.d, a Machine Gun in a post about V.26.b.33.45 and Machine Gun about V.26.a.97.60. Snipers where also very active from the large rectangular hedge south of the Road in V.26.b, Oxford Houses, Beek Houses and other points North of Lekkerboterbeek

3.            The bulk of our men were held up approximately on a line 150 yards East of the Country Cross Roads but a Party of 1 Officer & 6 men, the remains of a platoon, pushed on as far as V.26.b.40.15. Another small party under a sergeant got into the enclosure about Oxford Houses and fortified a shell hole at V.26.b.05.50. No advance appeared to be made on our left at all and so C Coy found a defensive flank facing North with three posts and one Lewis Gun post.

4.            The Machine Gun in the Cemetery was silenced almost at once by the 6^th Battalion Gloucestershire Regt and a number of Germans retiring North East of the Cemetery came under Lewis Gun and Rifle fire and suffered casualties. There was a lot of movement during the say between the Mebus [a type of Machine Gun shelter] at V.26.b.60.35 and the enemy post at V.26.b.60.25, this was always [sic] fired at and numerous casualties were caused, as was proved by the large numbers of stretcher parties about that point on the 10^th inst. A lot of movement around Oxford Houses was kept under fire.

The two Machine guns in the breastwork about V.26.b.33.45 were dealt with by rifle grenades and during the morning some of the enemy doubled round to the back of Oxford House with the runs and returned later with a light Machine Gun. The Machine Gun at V.26.b.9.60 was also dealt with by rifle grenades but unfortunately no Number 23 grenades were available on the spot and Number 20’s had a rather too long a range to fire accurately at that short distance.

5.            What actually happened during the 5pm attack will no doubt be dealt with by O/C 1/8^th Battalion Worcestershire Regt, I have seen none of the Officers or men who took part in it but my own men report that Worcesters went through our line well up to the barrage, which came down just in front of our main line but was right on top of the advanced posts mentioned in para 3, these fortunately sustained no casualties, though several blind shells landed very near them. The party in Oxford Houses enclosure report that they were 50 yards in front of the barrage. It was this barrage which made the Officer and N.C.O’s Commanding Coys in the line decide to retire and consolidate after dark about 100 yards in rear of their present positions. This was carried out and it was that rearline that was handed over to the Camerons.

6.            Very few messages were received back from the line after the attack, owing chiefly to the fact that most of the Officers became casualties and also that the heavy and accurate sniping made movement difficult.

7.            The chief lessons learnt were with regard to the barrage; 4 minutes before the first lift was no sufficient, with the ground in its present condition, 10 or even 15 minutes would not be too much to allow the Infantry to get well up to it.

The 100 yards left was too much, after it had “jumped” away from the infantry for the first time it was never caught up again. It also failed to deal effectively with enemy snipers and machine gunners who were situated between the first and second lifts, of it is practicable the 50 yard lift is much better.

In my opinion the reason why we failed to take our objectives were:
                (a) The exhaustion of the men, most of whom had been tramping over the heavy ground for he greater part of the night.
                (b) The sodden condition of the ground
                (c) That the barrage was lost after the first life and never caught up.