Military History

William is listed as being killed in action on 19 Dec 1914. He was originally listed as missing in action and a letter written to the Red Cross by his family in June 1915 reveals that it was some time before he death was officially accepted. The 1st Battlion war diary for the 19th December refers to a Report on Operations which is transcribed below.

1st Bn Rifle Brigade
Report on Operations of 19^th Dec

Reference Sketch Map of Ploegsteert Wood.

By 2.30pm on 19^th December the battalion was drawn up according to the orders issued, a copy of which is in possession of Brigade HQ. Permission was asked for and obtained for the Mountain gun to shell German House from 1.50 to 2.08pm, so as to allow I Coy time to get into position at the edge of the wood.

At 2.30pm the leading two platoons and the house parties under Captain Morgan Grenville, who was almost immediately killed by a shot from German House, moved forward out of the wood. The two supporting platoons moved up to replace them. Two platoons A Coy moved up to the forward trench and replaced two platoons C Coy.

As the leading platoons rushed forward they were met with a heavy rifle and Machine Gun fire. The bombardment by the Artillery appeared to have failed to keep the enemy’s heads down. The two nearest German houses were captured without difficulty and the Machine Guns under Captain Micklam promptly pushed forward into the second house.

On the right the first rush progressed as far as a fence just beyond the second German house and was there brought to a stop by the state of the ground and the German fire. On the left of German House the leading platoon under 2^nd Lt Daniell reached forward, but water, mud, shell holes, our own shell fire and the German fire resulted in many casualties and cause the attack to swing to the left apparently with a view to getting touch with the S.L.I. [Somerset Light Infantry].

2^nd Lt Daniell and a small party worked to our left, the men were all shot and 2^nd Lt Daniell has not been seen since and is presumably dead. The supporting platoon moved forward from the edge of the wood but was there checked chiefly by our own shell fire.

Both officers with the leading line having been killed almost at once, information was slow in getting back at the beginning of the fight.

At 3.24pm the position was as follows: one platoon working up in right of the German communication trench near the road running E by N from German House (this was the original supporting platoon) with one platoon in support; one platoon on road running N from German House hung up by machine gun fire from our right front and our own machine guns in German House.

Soon after Capt Riley was wounded and on his way back to be dressed reported that the rush had failed and that a firing line was being slowly built up on the right of the road. It was followed by Captain Bernard who had been sent up to see how things were progressing and by Captain Micklem from the second German House. These both reported that the firing line was dense enough and that the difficulties in advancing were due to the fact that no covering fire could be obtained and to the state of the ground. The also reported that the German earthworks appeared to be intact and unpar? by our shell fire.

I then decided that to push further reinforcements into the firing line would only lead to increased casualties without attaining our object; consequently at 4.40pm I despatched message No. 22.

During the later phase of the German fire was not continuously and it was most difficult to determine whence it came. Fire was only opened on us whenever a man moved.

Lt Gull had placed two platoons at the edge of the wood and these moved forward with the result that at 5pm a firing line had been forward, extending from the Hants T trench through the second German House to the edge of the wood in front of the Somersets trench where we were in touch with the Somersets. Our men were lying behind parapets of various old German trenches and were mostly in cover.

At 5.55pm message No BM29 was received and in accordance with successive orders from Brigade HQ, a withdrawal was carried out, one company being left to cover the operation of pivoting our the area.

In my opinion the reasons that we did not reach the line ? with the St. Yves road were as follows: a) Failure of the bombardment to keep down the enemy’s heads.
b) Early loss of Captain Prittle who was to have been in immediate charge of the directing and the officers of the leading company.
c) the state of the ground
d) the effect of our own shrapnel on the left of our line.