Military History

Thomas is listed as being killed in action one 8 Aug 1915 at Gallipoli. The following description of the events that led to his death are courtesy of the book A Gallant County: The Regiments of Gloucestershire in the Great War by Robin Grist. 

"The plan was for the New Zealand and Australian Division, with most of 13th Division, to advance north of the ANZAC perimeter. There were two assaulting columns; the one on the right was to advance up Rhododendron Spur to Chunuk Bair, and it is this advance that concerns the story of 7th Gloucesters. The attacking columns were to set off at 10.30 pm and reach the ridge an hour before dawn. The intention was to take further objectives once Chunuk Bair had been secured. The advance began as planned at 10.30 pm on 7 August. Rhododendron Spur ran from the beach to the peak of Chunuk Bair. There were four enemy outposts that had to be cleared before the main assault could start up the ridge. This was done by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, and although it was successful, the operation was now running about two hours late, making reaching the summit by first light difficult. The main part of this assaulting force was the New Zealand Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier General Francis Johnston. The Brigade made good progress on the north side of the spur and by 4.30 am, shortly before dawn, had reached ‘The Apex’, which was only about 500yds from the summit, where there were only a few enemy at the time. However, the Canterbury Battalion on the south side of the spur had been held up, and Johnston made what was, with hindsight, the fatal decision to wait for them to arrive before launching a final assault. By 8.00 am the enemy had reorganized and strengthened their defence of Chunuk

Bair, and the opportunity for a swift victory had been lost. Nevertheless, the Divisional Commander ordered the assault to continue, and the New Zealand Auckland Battalion advanced another 200yds to ‘The Pinnacle’, where the 300 men who had made it tried to dig in on the stony ground, from which it was a straight climb to the summit. The New Zealand Wellington Battalion was now ordered to continue the attack, but their commanding officer refused, stating it was hopeless and that he would take Chunuk Bair at night. Meanwhile, 7th Gloucesters, who had been in reserve and were about 1,000 strong, were ordered to reinforce the Wellington Battalion and began planning a night attack.

The Battalion War Diary for 8 August records the confused events:

Battalion received orders to stand to arms at 3am to form the left of an attacking first line, the Wellington Battalion being on the right. Other battalions formed lines in rear. The Wellingtons started forming up at 3:30am with two 7th Gloucester Companies, B & D (B on right) in the first line and A & C Companies in the second line. The advance started at 4:15am before D Company was quite in position and C Company (less 2 platoons on detachment) was still filing up the mule track. Longer time would doubtless have been given for the preliminary formations had it been realized how difficult filing along a mule track in the dark, with dug outs on either side, was. The advance started. A short while after starting the two left platoons of the first line came under enfilade M.G. fire from the left and were practically wiped out, the few remaining men of these platoons remaining in this place.

The advance was continued for some distance when the ground began to fall away steeply which in conjunction with the fact that the Companies were under enfilade fire caused the Company Commanders to wheel into line. About this time a staff officer of the New Zealand Brigade came up and ordered the companies to move to the right and gave his information that the Wellington Battalion had taken the hill Chunuk Bair. This movement brought the line of Glosters advancing towards the Sazli Beit Dere, which they crossed with the right rather advanced. Beyond the Southern slope of this Dere the line entrenched with the left about 60 yards beyond the Dere and the right about 200 yards.

Owing to change of direction there was a considerable intermixing of companies and units. The right of this line had afterwards to retire and dig in further back to escape enfilade fire (shell) from the right. The Turks were continuously attacking the line which in many cases had no time to entrench more than 6 inches. In spite of these attacks and heavy losses, especially in officers and senior N.C.Os, the line was held until relieved. Every officer and every C.S.M & C.Q.M Sgt were either killed or wounded and the Battalion consisted of groups of men being commanded by junior N.C.Os or privates. When the relieving troops arrived at dusk, most of these groups either went back or were sent back by officers of other Corps and continued for three days to re-join Battalion Headquarters in Overtons Gully.

The Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jordan, was severely wounded but was propped up and fought on as a sniper. Both the Battalion Second in Command and the only other Major were killed, as well as seven other officers. Three of the five Company Sergeant Majors had been killed, along with 200 Other Ranks. Fighting continued until 10 August and then petered out. The War Diary does not record the number of wounded, but on 1 September the effective strength was recorded as 8 officers and 263 other ranks, about a quarter of what it had been a month earlier.

General Sir Ian Hamilton wrote of the 7th Gloucesters in his Dardanelles Despatch: On they went, until, with a last determined rush, they fixed themselves firmly on the south-western slopes and crest of the main knoll known as the height of Chunuk Bair . . . The 7th Gloucesters suffered terrible losses here. The fire was so hot that they never got a chance to dig their trenches deeper than some six inches, and there they had to withstand attack after attack. In the course of these fights every single officer, company sergeant-major, or company quartermaster-sergeant was either killed or wounded, and the battalion by midday consisted of small groups of men commanded by junior non-commissioned officers or privates . . . Chapter and verse may be quoted for the view that the rank-and-file of an army cannot long endure the strain of close hand-to-hand fighting unless they are given confidence by the example of good officers. Yet here is at least one instance where a battalion of the New Army fought right on, from midday to sunset, without any officers".