War Diary Entries 16th to 18th
Trenches – 16 Feb 1917: Preparations were made for our attack in enemy’s trenches on the 17th inst.
Trenches – 17 Feb 1917: Attacked German trenches – see special account attached (4 tabs).
Casualties 2 Officers killed, 1 Officer died of wounds, 11 Officers wounded, 1 Officer shell shock.
36 Other ranks killed in action, 6 OR died of wounds, 162 OR wounded, 69 OR missing.
On the night of the 17th the Battalion was relieved by 12th Middlesex Regt and occupied dugouts at Monquet Farm. HQ being in dugout in Standing trench.
Trenches – 18 Feb 1917: Battalion was relieved and marched to Monmouth Huts near Aveluy.
Report - Difficulties of Communication
To appreciate the difficulties of communication and passing of orders and messages from Battalion Headquarters to Coys. previous to the attack the position of Coys. 12 hours before "zero" must be considered.
"A" Coy. who were to form the left assaulting Coy were at Wellington Huts.
"B" Coy. (4th Coy) were holding the Battle Front
"C" Coy. (Right assaulting Coy.) were at Mouquet Farm.
"D" Coy. (3rd Coy.) in Hessian and Fabeck trenches
Intercommunication by telephone was practically impossible owing to the congested state of the lines and communication by runners to the front Coy was difficult by daylight. Consequently programme of Barrage, maps, Aeroplane photo's, sweeping Picket and the hundred and one orders which necessarily pour in during the last 24 hours, could not be circulated as quickly as we would have liked and we could hardly ask Company Commanders if every man knew everything there was to know about the attack. Here one must remark that it would be everything if in future operations the line could be held by another unit. Probably a Coy. of the 4th Battalion right up till the time when the assaulting battalion has taken over the line in its Battle positions. The advantage I think are obvious
(1) the troops holding the line cannot be really fresh when the hour for the attack comes.
(2) the difficulties of communication, seeing the Company commander and issuing him final instructions, and for the Coy commander himself his difficulty of getting hold of his officers and NCO's when they are in advanced posts.
(3) The extra labour imposed on a third Coy. carrying dinners, water, rations, stores etc. to the Coy in the line.
Zero Hour & The Attack
A little before "Zero Hour" the enemy's barrage slackened a bit. At "Zero Hour" (5-45.am) our barrage opened and the men moved forward - they had been formed up in waves with two sections of the dug out clearing party of the 12th Middlesex Regt., which consisted in all of one Coy formed up behind each of our waves. The sniping and machine gun fire must have been very heavy if only from the fact that not one of one Coy. officers got further than the wire of Grandcourt Trench, and of all those that started at "Zero Hour", not one was killed or wounded by shells.
Throughout the operations it was remarkable the high percentage of men that were hit through the head, showing beyond a doubt that these Germans who had to meet us were no mean marksmen.
The wire in front of Grandcourt Trench was found, on the right especially, to be still fairly strong - the wire cutting operations could not have been as effective as had been thought. The delay in cutting this wire was accountable for a number of casualties, and as already pointed out there were no officers to lead the men beyond this point. Thenceforward Coy's. were commanded by N.C.O's. A Coy by a Corporal, "B" Coy by CSM Fitterer of whom more one cannot speak too highly - he took command of the assaulting wave of all the Coy's from Grandcourt Trench up to the final objective. "C" Coy was commanded by Sergeant Berry and "D" Coy by Sergeant Hazell both these N.C.O's did valuable work in reorganizing their Coys.
By the time Boom Ravine was reached the Battalion had diminished very considerably and men of all units were mixed together - 53rd and 54th Brigades and 2nd Division. CSM Fitterer made efforts to organise a line consisting of men of these various units to make an advance on the final objective. The line pushed forward formed sustaining a few casualties from machine gun fire from a N.E. direction. On reaching S. Miraumont Trench the wire was found to be so little cut that it was thought inadvisable to attempt to push through to the trench, so a line of shell holes was occupied. This move had been at about 8.am and the barrage was of course right away on the approaches from Miraumont.
After this position had been occupied for about half an hour an enemy counter attack from the direction of P 5 central led by an officer was seen to develop and the troops on the right and left began to retire. CSM Fitterer seeing that he and his men were being left in the air deemed it advisable to withdraw his men. The right Division continued to retire and were for taking up a line on the N bank of Boom Ravine and along the W Miraumont Road, but a few were rallied and were brought up to the crest about 300 yards N. of Boom Ravine. This was about 9-30.am. The Battalion took up a line along the bank in R.10.d just North of and running parallel to Boom Ravine, joining the Suffolks. Here a position was dug and wire was put out.
This constituted the main line of defence, for the remainder of the day but posts were pushed forward as far as 350 yards ahead of Boom Ravine. The enemy must then have had snipers out in shell holes in front of S. Miraumont Trench as in laying out a strong point Lieut. Inman R.E. and others of 80th Field Coy were hit from close quarters. Towards the evening, the enemy started to shell Boom Ravine. up till then he had kept up a steady fire on the Gully and the Ravine and had not shortened his barrage at all.
Results & Conclusion
The reason for the failure to reach the final objective and the lessons to be learnt have been fully dealt with by courts of enquiry and there need therefore be no further remarks added in this account.
An advance on which so many men displayed the greatest gallantry and devotion to duty, it is hard to select particular names but the following certainly deserve mention in any true account of the fighting CSM Fitterer mentioned frequently in this account is a shining example of a man who takes the lead without question when officers have become casualties, who reasons coolly and acts promptly whatever the circumstances, and who is looked up to and obeyed promptly by all - he was followed and supported throughout the day by Pte. Winter & Pte Taylor, two gallant Runners. He had command of the leading waves from Grandcourt trench right up to the final objective.
CSM Hazell and Sgt.Berry who were commanding Coys showed the same qualities and rendered CSM Fitterer the greatest assistance. Corporal Franklin, a Lewis Gunner, behaved with the greatest coolness engaging the enemy and although his guns were firing hard all day he never failed to keep up an ample supply of ammunition. He handled his guns boldly, choosing positions in a way which shewed great skill. L.Cpl.Morgan, a signaller, when three Runners had been knocked out in the effort to deliver an important message he volunteered and delivered it under the Company Commander in spite of the fact that he was blown over by a shell. Later he was invaluable in helping to rally men of the 2nd Division, he cheered them on and got them into positions under heavy Machine Gun and Rifle fire. He was then twice hit.
Pte.L. Butler, a Lewis Gunner, showed most conspicuous gallantry. He advanced his guns to a very forward position and accounted for a large percentage of the enemy who were endeavouring to counter attack.
