The Right Attack Column
The Right Column, under Captain Barwell, occupied its assembly trenches in H.17.a and H.lS.a before the bombardment started. These trenches were not much shelled. The first line penetrated about point 12.C.58, followed by the second line. A machine-gun opened from the German sap head, running from 12.C.58 to H.16, but was quickly bombed out of action. The wire was successfully destroyed by the artillery. This column secured the objective allotted to it, viz., 12.a.71 and 80, also 12.C.69 and 68. There were only a few Germans left in the first line, and they were despatched.
Captain Barwell himself, with some bombers, cleared the ruins of Bellewaarde, where a machine-gun was found facing south. He also cleared some dug-outs in the region of point 12.a.71.
By 5.20 a.m. the line was fairly established on this front, and communication established with the 5th K.S.L.I, on the right, but I received no report by runner that the enemy's first line and works south of Bellewaarde were captured until 6 a.m.
At 6.25 a.m. I had a report that the second line was secured. An attempt was made to push up bombs and ammunition by the communication trench from H.16 to 58, but at 7 a.m. it was reported that German snipers were very active from the direction of 12.C.6.7. These were some men evidently left behind, in the advanced sap, by the 5th K.S.L.I, attack, or who had come up from Eclusette. I asked the K.S.L.I, to have them bombed out.
I received a message from Lieut. Maude (timed 7 a.m.) that our men were holding the German second line and had dug in, and that 3 machine-guns had been captured, but that communication was not established on the left. He asked for a machine-gun to be sent. The sniping on the communication trench from the south was not going on at this time. I sent a message telling Lieut. Maude to establish connexion with my left column, and told him to look out for his left, as I had heard that the 9th R.B. had lost the second line again.
At 7.15 a.m. I sent a message, through the 9th K.R.R.C. at French dug-out, to inform the Brigade of the situation, as I had no direct communication. Previous to this I had sent a message by runner to the Culvert Post. Communication was very slow and much interrupted.
I sent up another machine-gun at this time, as it appeared that it was urgently required, and this gun was got up in spite of the snipers on the communications. The gunner was shot while setting up the gun, and it did not go into action.
At 7.45 a.m. I heard by runner that the Germans were advancing on the right and left fronts, and asked for S.O.S. to the F.O.O [Forward Observation Officer] and through French dug-out. The F.O.O. tried to flag it, and the Signal Officer also lamped it. The guns opened a few minutes later, but it was too late. At 7.45 a.m. I asked for 2 platoons from the 9th K.R.R.C. and some bombers.
I received a report, timed 7.50 a.m., that we were having to retire on our right, as the Germans were developing a strong attack, and that the enemy was also advancing from Bellewaarde Farm). Lieut. Maude came in at about 8 a.m. wounded.
The German attack developed rapidly. The enemy advanced from the north of Bellewaarde and from the wood east of the line (Dead Man's Bottom) along the north side of the Etang. The 5th K.S.L.I, and our men were forced to retire, and only just avoided being cut off by the enemy from Bellewaarde, who advanced in the open in front of H.17.a, their right appearing for a minute or two on the crest of the hill. Fire was opened at once by all the spare men in the trench (orderlies, etc.), and the enemy got into his front-line trench again. I saw about 50 Germans at this point. Our men suffered heavily in the retirement. I reported to the Brigade, by telephone through French dug-out, and by runner, that I was holding the original line with about 200 men. Two platoons of the 9th K.R.R.C. came into H.17 and H.18. I reorganized the defence as soon as shelling got less, and it became evident that the enemy did not purpose a further advance. According to report, our men accounted for 60 or 70 Germans in the attack, and dropped many more with rifle-fire in the Counter attack.
The Left Attack Column
The Left Column was to move out at the start of the bombardment and lie down in a field to the north of the Hedge Sap in an old trench and a hollow. It appears that they were spotted moving out, or that the Germans had reason to be suspicious of this piece of ground, for it was heavily shelled. The enemy sent up flares just after our men began to move out. At all events this column suffered very heavy casualties from shell-fire and were also shaken by the explosion of the mine, the debris of which fell amongst them.
When they did advance, according to men who returned, a machine-gun opened fire on them, and only 8 men of the first line reached the German lines with some of the 9th R.B. They mistook their direction also, and went more towards the line 04-24 than 41, which was their objective. Only about 7 men of the second line reached the German trench, but were unable to get in, and so took cover in shell-holes outside. The third was almost destroyed. A few men went with the column of the 9th R.B.
These facts account for the gap in the line to the N of Bellewaarde and the absence of news. Orderlies whom I sent returned saying that they could not get through. A bombing party which went up the Hedge Sap has not been heard of; there were many dead bodies in the trench. Carrying parties with bombs started up this way also, but were wiped out. These parties never succeeded in getting anyone back to let me know the state of things on that side.
From the reports of the men who went with the 9th R.B. it appears that they went into the line 04-24, and worked down to a redoubt in German second line. It does not appear that anyone went to the line 40-42 or beyond, as the men say that there was no one on their right, but that they bombed along the trench for some distance. They returned by the Crater, having to bomb their way back.
Men working in the C.T. [communication trench] up the Hedge Sap said that the sniping was very hot from the communication trench connecting 41 with the German second line, and that it was from there that the carrying parties were hit. The German counter attack from the left evidently came by this trench and reoccupied Bellewaarde after it was cleared by Captain Barwell.
From reports of men, our shell-fire had considerably damaged the German first line and dug-outs in the second line, especially south of Bellewaarde after it was cleared by Capt. Barnwell. From reports of men our shell fire had considerably damaged German first line and dug-outs in 2nd line, especially S of Bellevarde and about Point 71.
A derelict machine-gun and two dead gunners were seen on the parapet near the farm. A party of 40 or 50 Germans who had been working between their lines had been caught by the bombardment and totally destroyed. Thirteen prisoners, including an officer, were captured by our Right Column, but I understand that some of them were killed in the Sunken Road while being brought down.
Casualties
The Battalion's losses were 13 (out of 15) officers and 463 (out of 767) other ranks.
We retired and held our original line until relieved at midnight by the 10th D.L.I. The spirit of the men all through was admirable, in spite of heavy losses and drenching rain.
The casualties amongst the officers of the Battalion were as follows:
Killed.
Captain C. F. K. Carfrae.
2nd Lieut. L. W. Sweet-Escott.
2nd Lieut. H. F. Clarke.
2nd Lieut. L. S. Lee.
2nd Lieut. J. N. G. Mitchell.
Died of Wounds.
2nd Lieut. T. F. H. Fremantle.
2nd Lieut. A. W. Wood.
Wounded.
Captain N. F. Barwell.
Captain H. H. Cobb.
Lieut. E. W. Maude.
Lieut. L. S. M. Newman.
2nd Lieut. W. T. Beckingham.
2nd Lieut. C. H. Walker.
