Prelude to the Attack
In the previous narrative of events dealing with Bourlon Wood and the attack on Fontaine, it was mentioned that the 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards was relieved by the 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards on the night of the 27th of November.
Leaving Bourlon Wood the battalion marched back to the hindenburg line outside Flesquires skirting Anneux on the east and passing through La Justice thus avoiding the heavily shelled area on the West of ano where casualties had previously been sustained. After passing La Justice the enemy fired some gas shells and the Battalion marched for some distance in their gas masks. On the return march no casualties were sustained.
On the 28th of November the 3rd Guards Brigade marched to Trescault and at nightfall occupied tents which were pitched on some open ground between the Trescault – Metz Road and Havrincourt Road. Under orders of the Brigade Major, and for the purpose of avoiding aerial observation, the camp was struck on the following day, 29th, and repitched in Havrincourt itself. The weather was now perfect and proved to be the commencement of the fine spell that lasted throughout the battle. The spot selected was sheltered, and by nightfall the men will comfortably settled in - there was an abundance of wood available for braziers, and that night the campfires burned brightly along the South-Eastern fringes of Havrincourt Wood. The hardships endured in Bourlon Wood were forgotten, and all ranks were looking forward to being withdrawn to a back area for a rest.
Early on the 30th those who were awake heard the noise of a heavy bombardment coming from the east, but after their recent experience in Bourlon Wood paid no particular attention to it. The officers had completed their breakfasts, and inspections were in progress when at 9:20am an order arrived to stand to arms, and the reconnoitre a defensive position facing east. The enemy were reported to have broken through the British line near Gonnelieu. Hardly had the position been reconnoitred when a second order arrived at 11.45am for the Guards Division to concentrate at Metz, we're the 1st Guards Brigade lay bivouacked. The 3rd Guards Brigade fell in hastily and marched through Havrincourt to Metz. The roads were crowded with transport and as the Battalion passed through Metz a high velocity gun shelled the road in a disultory manner but inflicted no casualties.
Rumour was busy but definite news of any kind was withheld from the troops; probably the higher command itself was ignorant of the real situation. The Commanding Officer and 2nd in Command had read a message stating that the Germans had been seen marching in fours through Gouzeaucourt, a place of great importance since it was the railhead and the Headquarters of the 29th Division. More than this no one in the Battalion knew. Significant signs of a disaster were not absent, there was a total lack of gunfire, when did and unwounded without arms and equipment we're drifting back with incoherent stories, officers were seen in 1/2 dressed condition, heavy Gunners hurried past carrying the breach blocks of their guns.
The Brigadier and Commanding Officers of the brigade rode forward into Metz to try and glean some news. They saw a Corps staff officer but his information was of a confusing character and of no assistance. The 3rd Guards Brigade marched through Metz and out past the beetroot factory onto open ground and halted to await the result of the reconnaissance. At about 2.30pm the Brigade moved east in artillery formation the object being Gouzeaucourt. This objective in the meantime had been captured by the 1st Brigade who put to flight the German troops who were plundering the town. The direction of march was slightly changed for the rumoured purpose of a subsequent advance at dawn the next morning.
At about 5 o’clock on the 30th the 4th Battalion crossed the Trescault- Gouzeaucourt Road and Battalion Headquarters was established in a dugout on the road itself about 600 yards north of Gouzeaucourt. Companies rested in this area numbers 2-3 and four on the east of the road uh #1 on the road itself slightly north of Battalion Headquarters. The Trescault- Gouzeaucourt Road on the eastern side was honeycombed with dugouts previously occupied by Divisional R.E. and R.F.A. One of these was selected as Battalion Headquarters. The occupants had apparently evacuated their positions in a great hurry, as all their personal articles were lying about in the greatest confusion.
About 6.30pm that evening the cookers, which had been following the battalion as far as it was practicable, arrived and the men were provided with hot food; it is doubtful if any of the other units taking part in the action outside the Division were in such an enviable position. The Brigadier of the 16th Brigade of the 6th Division (General Walker) appeared at the battalion headquarters at about 11pm and informed us that his Brigade was under orders to attack Gonnelieu at 1am the following morning. As the 4th battalion Grenadier Guards was intimately affected by the result of their attack, he suggested holding his conference at our Battalion Headquarters. This conference took place, all the Commanding Officers of his Brigade being present. It was agreed we should be advised of the result of the attack.
The hurried manner in which the attack was organised, the patent lack of information on which it was based made it clear it was most unlikely to succeed. At 1am on 1st Dec a warning order arrived that in the event of failure of the attack the 16th Brigade, the 3rd Guards Brigade would assault Gonnelieu at 6.30am. The Commanding Officer was verbally instructed to arrange the parties to attack in conjunction with the commanding officer of the 1st Welsh Guards. Some time later an officer commanding a battery of tanks reported to say that the attack would be supported by 12 tanks. The Commanding Officer called in his company commanders to a conference and explained the situation to them.
With the most meagre information and orders at his disposal he proceeded in conjunction with the Commanding Officers 1st Welsh Guards to form his plans and write orders for the contemplated attack. It is important to bear in mind the following points which vitally affect the subsequent events.
The time allowed between the reception of the initial warning for attack and the attack itself was totally inadequate.
The brigade major, after the attack on Fontaine, had been sent on leave therefore the Brigade was very much understaffed and unable to render the assistance to Battalions which could have been expected at ordinary times.
The hurried move from Trescault for an indefinite destination made the Quartermaster's difficulties very great, also those of the Q branch of the Brigade.
The selection of a definite objective after dark making any kind of personal reconnaissance difficult, put a physical strain on the Commanding Officer which was intolerable. The whole planning of the attack, the writing of the orders, the conferences with the 16th Brigade and his own company commanders all had to be carried out in a space of four hours. The final dispositions depended on the attack of the 16th Brigade, which in any event was certain to leave an indefinite frontline and the result of the attack could not be known until a very short time before zero hour.
If the 16th Brigade attack succeeded the 3rd Guards Brigade had to relieve them, if it failed then the attack had to be made. These qualifications alone necessitated the working out of two alternative schemes. The Commanding Officer prepared in detail for the worst eventuality of the two. The plans were based on the use of tanks in conjunction with some artillery preparation.
It was clearly realised at Battalion Headquarters (Bn HQ) that the brigade was to be used in a manner now accepted as impossible except in great emergency, namely as a force of infantry without guns advancing across the open against an enemy occupying A trench system and groups of houses bristling with machine guns and supported by artillery. The emergency had arisen, the tanks water supply the lack of sufficient artillery.
Eventually news arrived of the failure of the attack of the 16th Brigade, the report of failure was clear, the information as to the new positions occupied entirely vague. The moment had arrived for the final preparations.
Battalion Headquarters moved through Gouzeaucourt on the sunken road between Gouzeaucourt and Villers Plouch, occupying a dug out on the eastern side of the road about 500 yards north of Gouzeaucourt. The companies preceded battalion headquarters, 2,3 & 4 companies crossed the Villers Plouch Road and deploying dug themselves in on the Gonnelieu side of the railway, facing that village. No 1 company remained in the sunken road spread out on both sides of Battalion Headquarters.
A further conference of company commanders was held at the new Battalion Headquarters and the Commanding Officer (CO) superintended a readjustment of the line with the object of maintaining direction when the advance commenced. The order of attack for the battalion was, 3 on the left, 2 on the right, 4 in support and 1 in reserve. The orders for the attack were issued at 3.15am on the 1st Dec and Zero hour was fixed for 6.30am on the same date.
The 3rd Guards Brigade order of battle was – Welsh Guards on the right, 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards on the left, 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards was employed in support to carry out the special role of protecting the left flank of the attack if threatened. The 2nd Battalion Scot Guards had previously moved up to hold the high ground about Villers Plouch and occupied a position some 1500 yards to the north of the point of assembly of the 4th Battalion. The 1st Guards Brigade attacked at the same time on the right flank of the 3rd Guards Brigade.
At 6.15am the Intelligence Officer with the forward party was sent to take up a position in a trench 300 yards in advance of Battalion HQ.
The Attack
The advance commenced at Zero and was accompanied by a feeble shelling by our 18 pounders of No 22 Ravine for the purpose of checking [German] reinforcements forming up there. A certain amount of overhead machine gun fire was employed. There was no artillery preparation on the battalion frontage or shelling of Gonnelieu itself.
The enemy’s reply was not delayed many minutes, it came in the form of very heavy machine gun and rifle fire. The enemy directed their fire accurately and the battalion had to advance in face of it for over 1500 yards before arriving at their objective. The line of advance was over open ground up a gentle slope leading to Gonnelieu, with no protection of any kind. The field of fire from the enemy’s point of view was they could ask.
The visibility was poor, as signs of dawn were only just commencing to appear, this made maintenance of direction difficult, but was probably sufficient to show up our men to the enemy as they came over the ridge. It appears that No Company went too much to their right and lost very heavily in front of the Welsh Guards HQ, No 7 platoon in particular being wiped out.
No 3 Company [including Joseph] maintained their direction and in their advance halted for a few minutes on the Cambrai Road. No 4 Company came up in between Nos 3 & 2 Companies. After the first 500 yards the advance was continued with a line of three companies in front and No 1 Company behind. This line was most advanced on the left and gradually fell away to the right.
In front of Gonnelieu was a trench occupied by a number of different Battalions, Rifle Brigade on the left with a few Oxford & Bucks and some Northants Pioneer battalion on the right. No 3 Company passed over the trench on the left and entered Gonnelieu, a few men under Lt Hardinge pushed round the north of the village and occupied a position in the cemetery. This party has a Lewis Gun with them and fired down a road running north to south through the village. The movement was made for the purpose of threatening the right flank of the enemy and enfilading his troops as they retired before Nos 2 & 4 companies and the Welsh Guards. The effect was demoralizing to the enemy and many casualties were inflicted on him.
This party was eventually reduced to Lt Hardinge and a Sergeant and the gun jammed. No troops advanced and there remained no alternative but to rejoin our men who were in trenches further back. This step was accelerated by the fact that other troops on the Battalions left commenced to fall back and allowed the enemy to occupy a trench from which he could enfilade the cemetery. This withdrawal was immediately followed up by groups of Germans who showing great initiative and grasp of open warfare principles/
Eventually Lt Hardinge and the Sergeant found their way back to a trench containing a few of the Rifle Brigade and organised a defensive flank at this point. Lt Hardinge was slightly wounded in the face and returned to Battn HQ to report on the situation as far as he knew it. Captain Burke and the remainder of No 3 Coy penetrated through Gonnelieu into the eastern outskirts. Their numbers were few and shortly afterwards, whilst they were attempting to consolidate, they were overwhelmed by a counter attack. The survivors retired in good order to a trench in front of Gonnelieu they had passed over before they entered the village.
Captain Burke was seen to be wounded and surrounded by Germans, his fate is still uncertain. His runner, Wilkinson, reported that three German Officers disarmed Capt Burke who was in no condition to defend himself coming suddenly on him from round a wall. The runner himself was surrounded but, being unwounded, used the butt of his rifle to such effect that he broke through and escaped to our lines, his retreat being covered by the rifle fire of his comrades who saw the whole episode.
Portions of the different companies under Lieutenant’s Chitty, Veitch and Abel Smith penetrated the village at various points but were all overwhelmed in the counter attack. No 2 company as has already been stated, lost direction at the start and their movements are difficult to follow. It is certain that they lost very heavily shortly after Zero. Evidence is forthcoming that Lieutenant Hubbard who commanded the company was killed early in the day before arriving at the objective and Lieutenant Denman was wounded later whilst gallantly attacking a German machine gun at a range of 30 yards. The balance of the company found its way into the trench before Gonnelieu which eventually became our frontline.
No 4 Company, on arrival at the trench in front of Gonnelieu was collected in the trench by Captain Paton, the elements that had crossed were recalled. This decision of Captain Paton’s was taken because he realised that No 2 company was not on his right flank, and further, that the Welsh Guards on the battalion’s right were also nowhere in sight, be there for gave orders to hold the trench until the situation had cleared up. About 10/30 Captain Paton, seeing some men of another unit on his left leaving their positions, thus endangering his left flank, meant across the open to rally them and was mortally wounded by a bullet.
No 1 Company had been the most fortunate as regards casualties, and arrived at the trench occupied by No 4 Coy in good strength and by arrangement between the two company commanders, occupied the trench and set to work to strengthen it and as far as possible protect the flanks.
About 7/30 the Intelligence Officer reported to the Commanding Officer that men of the unit on the left who are coming back and the latter went forward to investigate. He visited the support and frontline trench and while searching for Captain Sloane Stanley what's the daily woon did and had to be sent back to the dressing station at 8:00am.
About 9am the position was that the remnants of the elements that had entered Gonnelieu had fallen back on the trench in front of Gonnelieu and the position was being held by men of all company’s commanded by Captain Sloane Stanley supported by Lt’s Layton and Irby. All the remaining officers had become casualties.
The tactical position was hazardous in the extreme, the trench had both its flanks in the air, the left because of the retirement of the troops of another Division whom Captain Paton tried to rally, the right owing to the Welsh Guards not having come up on the flank and further because there was a dangerous gap at this point which the enemy repeatedly tried to enlarge. When the CO was wounded the command devolved on Major Pilcher.
On hearing of the retirement of the troops on the left Major Pilcher called on the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards and hurried forward one company on the Captain Rhodes to join up our left and form a definite flank. Later when major pilcher saw groups of Germans still advancing on the left he called on the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards for further support. After a conference with Lt Colonel Maitland two fresh companies under Captains Spence and Lawford were pushed up the sunken road leading from Viller Plouch Road to the Cambrai Road and came into action about 600 yards up that road. A short sharp fight took place and the Germans fell back. This timely stroke undoubtedly saved the Battalion's left flank and stiffened the troops on the left who appeared unreliable.
That night the King's Company, which was in reserve supplied 2 platoons to strengthen the front line and Lieutenant Stein led them forward and reported to Captain Sloane Stanley. The remaining 2 platoons were lent to the Welsh Guards. These movements were successfully accomplished and finally the line developed into a salient, the apex of witch fronting Gonnelieu what is held by the combined elements of all the companies of the 4th Battalion with some men of the Northampton Labour Battalion in touch with the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards on the left and with the Welsh Guards echelon and backwards on the right that nearest company being fully 300 yards behind with a large gap intervening as well this was the position until the Battalion was relieved on the 3rd of December by the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards.
The relief was doubly welcome since it had been promised for the previous night and the failure had resulted in the already exhausted officers and men having to spend a further 24 hours in the trenches exposed to a hard frost. They were only rationed on the morning of the 2nd before daylight by superhuman efforts have the failure to believe had upset all rationing arrangements.
On this date the battalion marched back on its way to rest and bivouacked in the open north of Gouzeaucourt Wood. The depleted battalion was reorganised on a three company basis and although hopeful of relief was momentarily anticipating another call on its services. This call was never made and at this point the battle may be considered to have finished as far as the 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards is concerned.
The Aftermath
The attack on Gonnelieu had been a severe test to all ranks, apart from the heavy casualties, the battalion had made the attack expecting support from 14 tanks and artillery. One tank only had appeared find a few rounds and retired. The artillery support was negligible. On the left troops of another unit had retired and on their right the Welsh Guards who were under the same handicap had not been able to advance to protect their flank, despite these great drawbacks the Battalion had maintained their position intact and undoubtedly if the tanks had arrived would have held the village of Gonnelieu itself.
As it was they inflicted very heavy casualties on the enemy, beating back four counter attacks by fresh troops specially detailed to advance at this point. It is of interest to note that a German officer captured on the day of the attack reported that his unit had attacked Gonnelieu at 6am, our attack commenced at 6.30am and that the Germans had been disorganised and their plans frustrated by our advance, which they took to be an immediate counterattack to their own thrust delivered with amazing rapidity.
The narrative would not be complete without mention of some of the individual acts which will always be remembered by those who took part in the action.
The Adjutant Captain C.R. Gerrard performed a very fine piece of work when at 7am he went forward to reconnoitre the position and report to the CO. The machine gunfire was very heavy and there was no cover yet he visited the whole front obtaining valuable information and returned to Battalion HQ untouched.
Lieutenant Irby, what are the surviving officers, held a block in the front trench against assistant bombing attacks, and eventually knocked out a German machine gun by counter bombing.
Sergeants Canham and Buckle behaved with the utmost gallantry throughout this. And at one time the two of them charged the advancing Germans and drove them back. There were many acts of individual bravery but the above stand out particularly.
