Report on Operations of 22nd April 1918
1st Battalion The Hampshire Regiment
Report on Operations of 22nd April 1918
INTENTION. The object of the attack was to establish a line through Pacaut Wood along the drive from Q.34.c.0.4. to Q.33.b.5.4.
METHOD OF ATTACK. The attack was to be carried out by 8 Companies; which were to cross the Canal at ZERO plus 3 minutes, one company to remain in support on the Canal bank.
Footbridges were erected at the following points for this purpose: W.3.b.2.7. – W.3.b.79. and Q.35.a.7.9 – Q.33.c.3.2
The advance was to be made behind a creeping barrage of 18 pounders, Companies pushing platoons up the various rides and along the edges of the Wood. On arrival at the objective, companies were to extend to their right and left and establish posts along the drive.
The frontages allotted to companies were as follows:
Right Company: From Q.34.c.0.4. (road junction inclusive) to Q.33.d.60.76.
Centre Company: From Q.33.d.60.75 (track inclusive) to Q.33.b.0.1.
Left Company: From Q.33.b.0.1. (track inclusive) to Q.33.a.5.4.
ASSEMBLY AND ADVANCE. By 5 a.m. the company holding the southern edges of Pacaut Wood had been withdrawn to the south bank of the canal and the Battalion was disposed with companies opposite the bridges by which they were to cross the canal. The opposite company was between W.3.b.3.7. and Q.33.c.4.5. with a Lewis Gun Section opposite each bridgehead.
At 5.15 a.m. – Zero hour – our heavy barrage opened on the wood, with a heavy trench mortar barrage on the southern edge of the wood.
At 5.18 a.m. – our troops commenced to cross the canal, and the enemy barrage fell along the line of the canal. It was especially heavy by the centre bridges and a few casualties were incurred before all the assaulting troops and casualties get across.
The right and centre companies came under machine gun fire from the wood almost at once, but the left met with no opposition. The right Coy, who were being held up by machine gun fire when nearing their objective, was successful in stopping some of this fire by pushing out Lewis Guns in front to cover the advance of the remainder.
By 5.35 a.m. the left company was on its objective, and by 5.40 a.m. the two right platoons of the right company were on their objective. The centre company suffered heavily in officers and NCO’s, and were held up for a little time, where they were in touch with the left company. As the enemy were still holding the wood about Q.33.d.2.9. the centre company forced up in the main drive facing east. In the meantime the right Coy extended to its left in the hopes of getting into touch again with the centre, as there was now a considerable gap in the line.
About 9 a.m., a platoon of the support company was ordered to proceed up the drive from Q.33.c.8.0. to Q.33.d.5.9. and to extend to its right and left at the latter point in order to link up the line. At the same time the right and centre companies were ordered to work inwards. Owing to the loss of the Officer leading the platoon up the drive, it was not until 10.30 a.m. that this platoon was able to make good the Cross Roads at Q.33.d.6.9.
About 11am the machine gun fire in the wood, which had been heavy all the morning, began to decrease, and the shelling on the Canal Bank increased.
At 1.30pm Lt Coll F.A.W. Armitage, DSC Commanding the Battalion, was killed.
At 3pm it was reported that the whole line was connected up and joining up the flank companies. The noise caused by this through the wood had, however, alarmed the enemy, who opened rifle and machine gun fire and sent up an S.O.S. A heavy barrage was at once put down on the wood and continued till about 5.15pm.
During this time, the centre company lost touch with the flanks. They, however, reorganised and again attempted by working through the undergrowth to establish posts south of the La Pannerie – Riez du Vinage road.
In the meantime 2 platoons of the Somerset Light Infantry in Le Gaury had been ordered to move up to the Canal Bank in support. This order was however subsequently cancelled as it was seen that connection could be maintained without involving another unit.
This movement had barely been initiated, when at 8.30pm the enemy were observed advancing in a south-easterly direction through the wood. Rifle and Lewis gun fire were at once opened and the S.O.S was sent up. The objective of this attack appeared to have been somewhere west of Pacaut Wood, but no enemy were able to debouch from the wood.
The Battalion line was at length entirely connected up by 12.45am on the 23rd instant, the centre portion consisting of posts 12 yards apart about 25 yards south of the Drive. This was, however, was not reported until about 11am on the 23rd. As soon as it was ascertained that the centre was short of the objective, as party of 12 men was organized from the Support Company, who had sustained heavy casualties on the canal bank. These were ordered to establish posts on the drive, and it was hoped to be able to advance the existing line up to the same points. It was inadvisable to draw more than 12 men from the support company, as this would have endangered the Canal Bank in case of a hostile attack
At 5.45am [23rd] it was reported that posts had been established, but later information showed that they were still short of the objective. The enemy shortly afterwards dropped great activity along the front in the wood with bombs and machine guns.
An attack was made on the posts at Q.33.d.9.4., but it was repulsed. In view of the impending relief, it was considered inadvisable to make another attempt that night.
During the operation several machine guns and about 55 prisoners were taken. 13 machine guns were brought back. Other ranks.
The battalion casualties were 8 officers and about 200 other ranks.
With regard to the method of carrying out the attack, it is considered that the objectives could have been gained with fewer casualties if the three attacking companies had been formed up north of the Canal before zero hour.
In the actual attack, the centre bridge was heavily shelled as soon as our barrage came down, and the leading officer of the centre company was actually killed on the bridge, and many men put out of action there or in the immediate neighbourhood. This occasioned some temporary disorganisation and delay, so that the Centre Coy in their advance through the wood were too far behind our barrage, consequently a German machine gun at about Q.33.d.2.8. got into action on them when our barrage had passed over the objective.
Major P.H. Hudson, Commanding 1st Battalion Hampshire Regiment. 25/4/18
