Early on the 8th, Major Homan held an officers’ _ meeting in the front line to decide on the spot a few points about the attack. The day passed peacefully except for the artillery bombardment which was in progress. Everybody seemed cheerful, and two Companies held sing-songs after tea. At 9.30 p.m. the whole Battalion was at the point of assembly in Torquay Camp.

At 9.50 p.m. the 77th Infantry Brigade began their attack on the right, and the enemy evidently thinking that we might feel the want of attention, started shelling us with 5.9 H.E. mixed with Diphosgene and Tear shells. The gas, though comparatively innocuous, owing to the slope of the ground, caused some annoyance and confusion; particularly to some officers who were having parting drinks and smoking the best Havanas in B Company’s mess. Apart from the incalculable harm done by the gas to the cigars, it is almost an impossibility to smoke in a gas mask: though the story is told that in the days of P.H. helmets, a gunner officer, finding that his mouthpiece was missing, had substituted a pipe instead through the hole in the flannel. It was as well that the gas shells were not in the Jumeaux, for it would have been nearly impossible to go down and up the steep slopes more or less blindfolded by a mask.

Though the assault was not to take place till twenty minutes past midnight, to allow for difficulties of crossing the Jumeaux, we left out trenches about 10.45 p.m., in accordance with Brigade arrangements. B and C took the left hand communication trenches to C 6, passed the gap already cut by Baker in the wire, and went down Tor Ravine, while A, followed at a longer interval by D, used a gap at the point of C 4. This gave on to the steepest part of the hill, but they succeeded in crossing at a pace which would have done credit to a guides race. The Battalion was in position by 11.30 p.m. This was much too soon, but no one had ever imagined that we could cross the Jumeaux with such ease and safety. Our casualties were few. The enemy seemed to be too busy in shelling Dorset Ravine to occupy himself with the more direct route. Just as we were congratulating ourselves on getting safely deployed on the higher slopes of Petit Couronné, the enemy started dropping heavy trench mortar shells among us. The second or third fell right upon Major Homan, Miller, C.S.M. Smith, and some runners, who were all seriously wounded. A minute later Salvesen was badly hit and Hodges was incapacitated. Thus only six officers were left with A, B and C Companies, and to make matters worse one of our own 6-inch howitzers dropped one or two shells short into the first wave of B Company.

After consultation with White, I signalled back at 11.40 p.m., asking that our barrage might hit as soon as possible, as no good could result from having to wait 40 minutes where we were. This, however, could not be done, and the original time of assault had to be adhered to.

Owing to the slope of the hill and the accuracy of the 18-pounder barrage, our first wave was able to creep within 20 yards of the enemy’s trench before assaulting. Thanks to our Artillery the wire was no obstacle at all, and our first wave had little difficulty in disposing of the few Bulgars left in the front line. They were brave men, as their fire trench could hardly be said to exist. Owing to our shelling, it was often 8 to 10 feet wide, and never more than 3 feet deep, while all dugout entrances were blocked.

The taking of the second objective was not such an easy task. On the right No. 4 Platoon, under Stukeley, backed by the rest of A Company, soon overcame the resistance, and did much good work bombing dugouts on the north side of the hill. The left, however, fared worse: Kelly of B Company had been badly wounded in the leg just before the assault, and Hutchins, the only officer left in the Company, had been partially buried. The left half of the second objective comprised communication and support trenches, to reach which entailed a partial left form. Garland brought up a platoon of C Company on the left of B, and seems to have got into the left of this second objective where he was last seen trying to drive off a Bulgar counter-attack. But in front of the rest of the Company’s objective a heavy barrage and determined resistance held up the attack. The rest of C Company became inextricably mixed up with B, and in spite of superhuman efforts, led by Steele, Garland and Hutchins, our men were brought to a halt.

On the assault of the first objective, the Bulgar had put down a very heavy barrage behind us in the Jumeaux. Bursting in the narrow gorge the 8-inch shells made a perfect hell of the place. were safely across however, some time before the enemy guns opened. They deposited their loads in the Green Pan, a natural hollow on the south-east slope of the hill, and moved up to advanced Headquarters, about 80 yards south of the middle of our first objective. Major Wheeler then took charge of the operations. All our original telephone wires had long been broken, new ones were broken as fast as laid, and the only method of sending messages was by signal lamp to the Colonel on Rockley and to Major Cottrell of the gunners in his O.P. at C 6. Though Sergt. Woodford, of the Signallers, worked with extraordinary coolness and skill, yet the transmission of messages was of necessity a long and tedious business compared with direct telephonic communication. Very little information of any value about the situation in the front line, however, could be collected. Not a single runnet got back from the leading Companies, and during the wait D Company was losing very heavily through the Bulgars’ remarkably well directed trench mortar fire.

About 12,45 a.m. the actual situation was as follows: When the left of the attack was held up, A Company made an attempt to bomb their way down the trench and take the enemy in flank. They were unsuccessful. Stukeley, with whom the movement originated, had been buried and hit several times with bombs. Hutchins, the only officer left with B and C Companies, had also been buried and had a shrapnel bullet through his leg. For the rest, Garland had been killed on the left of the second objective; Baker had been killed, it is supposed, at the left of A Company, while Steele had died through wounds and loss of blood. Though wounded twice, if not three times, and with one leg shattered, he had sat on the parapet of the enemy’s trench D Company throwing bombs until he fell back dead into the arms of his men.

A Company had also had their hands full with counter-attacks ; the worst of these came from Deep Ravine. About 200 Bulgars assaulted the hill, singing and shouting, but they were driven off chiefly through wonderful work of the Company’s Lewis guns in the hands of Dorrill and Sergt. Carter.

Then followed the most critical period of the night. The enemy concentrated all his trench mortars and guns on to the top of the hill. The enemy trenches afforded no cover in their damaged condition: men were killed and buried on all sides, and in addition one of our own Howitzers again dropped some shells amongst B Company. The result was that the ‘lengthen barrage’ signal had to be sent up, for though Hutchins made an attempt to get through with his pocket torch from the top of the hill, signal communication by visual was so difficult owing to the smoke from the barrage in the Jumeaux, that a message explaining the difficulty would have taken half an hour to transmit, and under the circumstances immediate relief from this Howitzer was essential if we were to hold on. The Bulgar, who was even then massing men on the far side of the hill for his final counter-attack, must have, therefore, almost completely escaped our barrage.

Hyslop, Bishop and Sergt. Hudson had previously been sent up from our advanced Headquarters on the south slopes of O4 to report on the state of affairs. The last named, though wounded, had succeeded in bringing back information. Stukeley was just about to put the 8th Oxford Platoons on to wiring in the ground gained when the main counter-attack started about 1.30 a.m. Instead of wiring they were used in the firing line. In spite of this, however, and in spite of the efforts led by Stukeley and Hutchins, the only officers left of the original attacking companies, the line was steadily driven back from the second objective. The remaining platoons of D Company were now thrown into a last desperate effort to retake the top of the hill, Major Wheeler, White, and every available man of the Battalion and attached troops joining in. But all was of no avail. Finally, there was nothing to do but hold our first objective and wait until the Berks should arrive at 3.30 a.m.