10am to 12.15pm
10 to 10.30am: The enemy opened a very heavy barrage on all trenches of the Sector and South of the Canal, and attacked our Right Coy and the 29th Division S of the Canal. Artillery support was asked for by telephone and obtained, but immediately afterwards the telephone was disconnected and all communication with Brigade cut. Our Right Coy was driven out of its trenches but Capt. A.M. Lascelles with the remainder of his Coy (about 12 men) immediately counterattacked and drove the enemy (about 50 strong) back, causing them severe casualties/
11.30am: A very heavy barrage was opened out on all trenches, causing severe casualties. The enemy again attacked and was driven back by the left Coys, but drove the right Coy right out, capturing Capt. Lascelles and establishing Machine Guns in the house by the Lock in L.24.b. S.O.S Rifle Grenades were fired from Front Line and from HQ but no artillery support was forthcoming. The reserve Coy then counter-attacked and drove the enemy out again, causing him severe casualties but suffering heavily themselves from Machine Guns in the Lock House.
12.15pm: About 12.15 the enemy again attacked in large forces the K.S.L.I on our left and the whole of our front. The right Coy was again driven out but the two left Coys were able to hold on, causing very severe casualties to the enemy. The S.O.S Rifle Grenade was again fired, but with no result. The right flank of the Battalion was then in the air, and a block was made, but there were no bombs to defend it with.
12.45pm: About 12.45 the enemy attacked heavily all along the line and drove out the K.S.L.I on our left and our left Coy. The remainer of the Battalionm who had suffered very severely from the continual bombardments and counter-attacks, were practically surrounded. The enemy could be seen to debouch from Masnieres in artillery formation to follow up the success. The remainder of the left Coys succeeded in fighting their way back to the strip of Reserve Trench, where the remainder of the Battalion re-organised.
12.45pm to 4pm
12.45pm: About 12.45 the enemy attacked heavily all along the line and drove out the K.S.L.I on our left and our left Coy. The remainer of the Battalionm who had suffered very severely from the continual bombardments and counter-attacks, were practically surrounded. The enemy could be seen to debouch from Masnieres in artillery formation to follow up the success. The remainder of the left Coys succeeded in fighting their way back to the strip of Reserve Trench, where the remainder of the Battalion re-organised.
I got touch with the Officer Commanding the K.S.L.I who informed me that his left was driven in and that the enemy had broken through his line also and we decided that the position was untenable as there were no signs if support and that the only thing to do was to evacuate the remainder of the Battalion over the Railway Bridge while there was yet time. This we did in good order without being observed by the enemy.
I re-organised my men (about 80 to 100) on the Sunken Road (L.22.d.15.15 to L.28.a.85.00) and advanced to support the 29th Division and cover the S side of Marcoing, forming a line along the ridge just SW of Margoing Copse. I found the 88th Brigade HQ and reported to the G.O.C. Meanwhile the 88th Brigade had done as successful counter-attack S of the Canal which had had the effect of preventing the enemy from moving down the North Bank. The enemy were reported by the 88th Brigade not to be holding the N Bank.
3.45pm: 1 Company of the Bedfords arrived to support
4.00pm: At 4.pm under orders from G.O.C 88th Brigade, we re-crossed Barge Bridge, re-took reserve line, meeting with opposition from enemy outposts on the Railway at L.23.d.20.40 and further up the trench. These were captured, 4 prisoners being sent back and the remainder killed. I then pushed to round to cover the Railway Bridge and, reinforced by another Coy of the Bedfords, established, established a line from L.23.d.40.40 to L.23.d.80.85 and L.23.b.00.30, covering both bridges. The enemy were holding the lines of our old trenches strongly and bombing into us at L.23.d.80.85 which was difficult to deal with as we had no bombs.
10.15pm to 1.10am [4th Dec]
10.15pm: At 10.15pm I received orders to withdraw the whole line and man the east side of the Canal, getting into touch with Y & L [York & Lancaster] on the right and the Bedfords on the left, and to order the R.E to blow up the bridges. The withdrawal was successfully carried out without casualties. Touch with Y&L and with Bedfords was obtained W of Canal and the bridges blown at 1am. There was some trouble about the Barge Bridge, as the barge had become stuck in the mud owing to the water of the canal going down.
1.10am [4th December]: At 1.10am I received orders to withdraw to L.20 which I did, leaving the R.E Officer to arrange for the destruction of the Barge Bridge by shell fire or fire.
The total casualties were 6 officers killed, 1 Officer missing believed killed and 7 officers wounded. Other ranks Killed 33, wounded 109, wounded and missing 3, missing believe killed 45, missing 72.
The number of missing does not represent prisoners. Nearly all these men were killed and buried during the severe fighting and heavy bombardments but owing to the continuance of the fighting it was not possible to identify them.
Officers and men fought splendidly throughout the day. Had it not been for the manner in which they stood the bombardment with so little cover and the readiness with which they responded to all calls for counter-attack, the whole force north of the Canal must have been captured as the enemy forces used against us were very heavy, and had he once he penetrated to the Bridge nothing more could have been done to prevent the capture of the whole force. The great difficultly throughout the day had been lack of any communications with the rear & therefore lack of artillery support, the SOS Rifle Grenades found quite useless.
