Narrative of Operations
The Battalion – strength as Appendix “A” [23 Officers; 79 NCO’s & 358 men] – moved from Assembly Point, Scrub Valley, at 3:45 p.m., 2nd. inst., under Brigade instructions to take over the Battle Front from details of the 50th. Inf. Bde.
Upon arrival at place where Guides from 50th. Inf. Bde. were met, a road between Beaucamp and Villers Plouich, by the Brigade Major, 184th. Inf. Bde., who stated he had instructions to divert the Brigade southwards, in the Line. I declined to carry out these instructions without written orders from the Brigadier-General, 184th. Infantry Brigade.
I proceeded to interview the Brigadier-General, at his HQ’s. and get into communication with Brigadier-General Evans, by phone, who instructed me to carry out the original instructions.
The action of the 184th. Infantry Brigade caused a delay of one hour and might have caused heavy casualties to the Brigade waiting in column of route.
The Officer in charge of the Guides informed me that fighting was proceeding in his Battalion Sector, and I decided, before attempting to effect any relief, to assemble the Battalion in the Front Line Trench, without casualties. The march to the Trenches was successfully carried out and without casualties.
Upon interviewing the O.C. I found that the situation was obscure; west of the front to be taken over or the line on the high ground on Bonhuits Ridge having been lost during the evening and the troops were occupying ground along the road in R.18.d. in front of O.G.1. and in the O.C. front line trenches behind.
3rd December: After interviewing Brigadier-General Evans, I decided to take over the Line as it was. This was successfully carried out, relief being completed at 3.15am, at dawn the Battalion was holding the Line as shown in Map, Appendix “B”.
One Coy. of 2/6th. Bn. R. War. R. were in support. A Company of 2/5th. Bn. R. War. R. were on the right and in touch with Battalion. The night passed quietly and there was no enemy activity until:
8am: A bombing attack of enemy gained a footing at R.10.c.8.8. but he was speedily ejected.
10am: Some men of 183rd. Infantry Brigade commenced passing through our trenches stating enemy had broken through our line. They were ordered back to their sector.
Except for a Coy of 2nd/5th R War R our flank was now exposed and the flank Coy “X” had hard fighting, repelling enemy bombing attacks. “Z” Coy. was also subjected to the same fighting.
10:30am: Two Companies of 184th. Infantry Brigade seen advancing in Artillery Formation in R.24.d.
11:15am: Repeated attacks upon Battalion sparks by Enemy Bombing parties but in no case was ground given up, but we were greatly hampered by the scarce supply of bombs and rifle grenades available. A fair supply of the enemy stick bombs were found and used.
All the attacks were supported by Heavy Enemy Artillery Fire. The attacks were made with great determination and the throwing of bombs was very accurate.
11.30am: Received information that 184th Infantry Brigade was at disposal of 182nd Inf. Bde.
11.57am: X. Company warned to watch right flank.
12 noon: Enemy seen in numbers on slopes, Bonavis Ridge, R.17 and 18. Determined attack on “Z” Company at Sunken Road and they had to withdraw to O.G. Support Line. The enfilade M.G. fire from SE was very heavy and almost from the rear of the position which had never been a good one. This withdrawal left “X” Coy’s left flank exposed.
12.5pm: 2/Lt. Raggit, 2/4th. Gloster Regt. reported that he had withdrawn from La Vacquerie with 20 men having been cut off from his battalion. Ordered him to rejoin a Company of his battalion in vicinity.
1.15pm: Enemy seen in large numbers on Ridge R.4, and 5.
1.40pm: S.O.S sent up on 183rd. Inf. Bde. front.
3.45pm: Upon report from O.C. “W” Coy. that casualties had been heavy in counter-attacking bombing attack, 2/Lt. Gross and 1 Platoon, 2/4th. Glosters were sent as reinforcement to that Company front.
5.12pm: Enemy bombardment, which had been heavy, ceased.
5.20pm: Enemy advanced in strength and attacked the Coy. 2/5th. R.War. R. and “X” Company who were driven into O.G. trenches behind their positions. The attack was determined and delivered from the front and from the exposed flank and the M.G. fire was very deadly. The two Companies put up a good fight and the enemy only gained the ground with heavy casualties. Upon receiving the report of O.C. “X” Company I ordered that a counter-attack should be delivered and the ground re-taken. This was successfully carried out and the enemy bomed out of the trenches.
9.30pm: The Brigadier-General discussed the situation and decided to readjust the front held S of the Sunken Road in R.10. a&d. The night was quiet and the readjustment of front was carried out, without the knowledge of the enemy, by 6 a.m. [4th].
