ARGHYL DERE. The Bn arrived in the DERE just before dawn and stayed here all day. At 21:00, after a final meal and having left their iron rations, packs and haversacks also behind, the Bn set out up the DERE in this ultra-light fighting order. The passage was very narrow and entirely blocked by mules with native drivers. Headway was therefore extremely slow and halt frequent and of long duration. No Officer appeared to be there to regulate traffic. Lt De BLABY wounded.

 

ARGHYL DERE. Daylight found the Bn near the top of the DERE. Eventually it came out on the right of a ravine near the top of the DERE. Then followed a great deal more moving forwards, moving backwards and along halts, during which the Bn managed to get another meal, supplies having been brought up to them. All this indecision of movement was due to the fact that the General Officer commanding the Bde (39th) had been misled in his instructions as to the shortest and best way to his position of assembly. The Bn then (less C Coy) took up a position near the top of this ravine and entrenched themselves. C Coy was left in reserve, quite a mile below in the DERE, much too far away under any circumstances and all the more so under these conditions, considering the difficulty of keeping open communications with the rear. The position of the Bn was bad, unavoidably. A heavy rifle fire was being kept up continuously on the Bn from higher ridges on each flank and in front several casualties resulted, amongst which Capt and Adjt J V GODFREY figured, being severely wounded. The night was quite quiet.

 

The British attack which was timed for 04:30 was a failure. The preliminary bombardment was aimed out by two cruisers, and when our infantry advanced they also got bombarded by our guns; consequently they withdrew with loss to our original positions. The Bn was not in the first line of attackers. A substantial reinforcement of 5 fresh Bns was expected today, but they never arrived having lost themselves somewhere in the DERE.

 

Just before dawn, the TURKS attacked all along our line engaged A Coy in particular, very heavily. They advanced under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from higher ridges in front and from both flanks. They also employed big spherical bombs of unusual size which they rolled down the slopes in amongst our men, causing heavy casualties. Half of C Coy reinforced on the left and suffered heavily in the process. A part of B Coy then reinforced A Coy also being severely handled in coming up. By 07:00, Lt Col NUNN, Maj CROFTON, Maj BOYD-MOSS , Capt ROLPH, 2nd Lts LANCASTER and E L HISCOCK had been killed. Maj BARKER, Capt HORSFIELD, Lts NEAME and BELLAIRS and 2nd Lt MARSHALL wounded. The Bn then began to give ground. Other Regts on the flanks did also. The enemy however did not follow. Their casualties also were enormous from the combined fire of Naval guns and Infantry fire. All this while, Capt GIBBON had been holding an advanced position on the right, known as GURKHA REDOUBT. They stayed on here all day, even after the Bn had retired. They do not seem to have been attacked at this post, although with two machine guns, they inflicted severe losses on the enemy. In evening, finding communications with the rest of the Bn was impossible, the party in GURKHA REDOUBT retired on their way back stopping to render very useful service in removing wounded from the old line held that morning, which operation was being superintended by an unknown Colonel of the RAMC.

 

 

The day was spent down in the DERE resting and re-organising. Capt GIBBON took over command with Capt MUNNICK as Adjt. Lt PEARSON commanded A and B Coys, 2nd Lt CAVANAGH commanded C and D. Lt SLADDEN was in charge of one machine gun. The strength of the Bn was now 360, thanks to a draft of 50 ranks and file who had joined from LEMNOS last night.