Military History

John is listed as being killed in action on 13 Nov 1916. The War Diary Report on Operations 12th to 16th November 1916 is transcribed below and should be read in conjunction with the fuller story of the Battle of the Ancre above.

"Having left bullets in Burton court on the night of the 12^th November my battalion was in position in Ellis Square, View Trench and Fort Hoxstead at 5:40am on the 13^th.

At 10.10am [13^th] 2 Coys (A & C) were ordered up and placed under the orders of G.O.C. 5^th Brigade. At 10.30am the other 2 Coys were attached to the Divisional reserve under the command of Col. Barnett-Barker.

At 1pm I met the G.O.C. 99^th Brigade at White City (by order). I returned to my Headquarters at 6pm with orders that the two Coys in Divisional Reserve (B&D) would be attached to G.O.C. 5^th Brigade until Zero – 2 hours when they would be formed up to support the left of the attack which was to be delivered by Berks (left) and 1^st K.R.R.C (right) at 6am 14^th. A & C Coys, who had been moved up into Green Line were to support the right of the attack.

I issued orders which were to come into force at Zero – 2 hours A & C Coys under Capt Humfrey then in the Green Line would remain there and get in touch with the 1^st K.R.R when the latter passed through them. (This was successfully carried out and A & C Coys were in touch with the 1^st K.R.R during the whole operation eventually holding the line of the Sunken Road with them.

B & D Companies would form up in Chatham from, Egg Street to Sixth Avenue. B Coy on the left, D Coy on the right. At Zero (at which hour the Royal Berks were to leave the Green Line) these two Coys would advance from our O.B.L. and occupy position in German second line.

Machine Guns: I gave orders for one machine gun to be attached to Capt Humfrey and go over with him. The team went over but arrived without its gun. One gun was attached to D Coy and started over with it but dropped it into a shell hole in No Mans Land and was not seen again. The remaining two guns at my disposal (under their officer) were placed by me under the orders of Capt Lewis for the protection of the left flank. A separate report has been forwarded about the action of machine guns.

Lewis Guns: Two went over with each company and the remaining two were given to Capt Lewis for the protection of the left flank.

B & D Coys had a somewhat difficult and fatiguing duty. At 7pm [13^th] they drew as much ammunition and as many bombs as they were able to carry from the Quarry Dump in Sixth Avenue to the 2^nd German Line. They did not return to O.B.L. till 3.30am [14^th] and then had to go to their assembly positions. A certain number of men lost their way and the O.C. Coys had very little time to collect their Coys. I may point out that in my AL51c of 14^th. I stated that if these Coys did the carrying above mentioned I could not ensure their being in position to advance at Zero.

I consider the two Company Commanders (Capt’s Lewis and Rattray) deserve the greatest credit for the way they got their men into position. Despite their efforts there were a certain number of men who could not be collected in time.

At 7am [13^th] I established my Headquarters in White City with an Advanced HQ under Major Winter in Chatham in immediate touch with B & D Coys. After the advance of B & D [Coys] I found it impossible to keep touch with these Coys. 6 attempts were made to lay cable lines but they could not be maintained as they were continually cut by shells. Orderlies suffered  rather severely from snipers near the E end of Cat Tunnel and it was some hours before I could get a message back.

At Zero (6am. 14^th) I ceased to have an active command and from then till 2.30am 15^th I remained in White City collecting reports through 5^th Brigade and from stragglers wounded and other messages from the front line. I transmitted them to G.O.C. 99^th Brigage and did my best to master and inform him if the situation.

At 2.30am [15^th] I went over to the German front line at Q.5.a.3.5 and established my Headquarters there with 1^st K.R.R. From then on, every effort was made to get into touch with my two left Coys. The trenches were appalling and the barrage very heavy but about 4.30pm Capt Lewis succeeded in getting through to me and he and Capt Humfrey were both with me when at 9pm I received orders to move my Battalion back to Ellis Square etc. A&C Coys moved by Beuamont Hamel, B & D over the top and via Sixth Avenue. I reported relief completed at 2.15am 16^th.

I reported to G.O.C. 99^th Brigade on morning of 16^th and told him the disposition of our front as far as I knew them. I asserted then and I still assert that at any rate up to the time my Battalion left German lines we did not occupy the junction of Munich Trench and Lager Alley & from all reports I had received our line to the N of the Sunken Road bent in a N.W. direction and struck Lager Alley either at K.35.D.5.5 or K.35.D.1.66.

At 2pm [14^th] the position on the left of our Brigade was so obscure and the position my two Coys still unknown. I therefore sent Majp Winter my 2^nd in Command to make a reconnaissance and endeavour to locate the position of both detachments of my Battalion and find out the situation on our left. I attach a very excellent report which Major Winter gave me as a direct result of a reconnaissance under great difficulties and from he returned much fatigued from his great exertions in the heavy mud".