William is listed as dying of wounds on 23 Mar 1915 at the 8th Casualty Clearing Station and was subsequently buried at nearby Bailleul. We cannot be sure when William was wounded and the 4th Battalion war diary entries for the period 15th to 24th March are transcribed below:
War Diary 14th & 15th March 1915
15 - 3 - 1915: Counter attack delivered against the Germans at St. Eloi by 82nd Bde unsuccessful. At about 3am orders received to attack the mound. For account of the attack see attached report marked I.
Casualties Killed: Major Am King; Capt B Selby Smyth; 2/Lt G J Stobart; 2/Lt L. D. Davies + 16 men killed.
Wounded: Capt H. B Mostyn Price; Lt R.C. Hargreaves; 2/Lt L.R. Dunne; 2/Lt C Saunders; 2/Lt T Willis and 62 men
Missing: 2/Lt T.P.A Ritchie and 17 men
Appendix I
Report of night attack on the Mound carried out by 4 Bn Rifle Brigade on the early morning of the 15th
About 3am I received orders to attack the mound. The P.P.C.L.J being ordered to co-operate on my left and to attack the mound from the East of St. Eloi-Ypres Road. My information at this time pointed to the R. B. and K.S.L.I trench were not held by either side. I moved out immediately from Voormozeele and halted with the head of the column near the Bus House to allow the P.P.L.C.I to get up on my left. As the P.P.L.C.I were blocked in Voormozeele and as it would have been light in about an 1 1/2 hours time I decided to go on, as I moved on the P.P.C.L.I moved into the field on my left.
About this time I received a message saying that the R.B and K.S.L.I trenches were occupied by the Germans. An officer I think of the Royal Irish who had been up at St. Eloi reported that it was impossible to get beyond the bus in front of S9. The situation was so uncertain and information so vague that I could not issue any definate orders until I have moved in with a view to ascertaining what the situation was. I therefore moved on with my battalion to a falled tree on the road in from of S9 having left one company in reserve at Bus House. On arrival there heavy fire was opened from my right front, presumably from R.B trench. I immediately one company under Captain A.B. Mostyn Pryce to attack the R.B trench previously warning S.9 that they were going to do so. The next company under Captain M.B Selby was ordered to move up the road by platoons and rush the mound. I had to give about 1/4 hour to allow Captain Mostyn Pryce to deploy his company and it was about 4.40am before the first platoon moved up the road.
They were heavily fired from Barricade A and from houses and it was reported that all except 4 men had been either killed or wounded including Capt Selby Smyth and 2/Lt C Saunders. I then ordered the remainder of the company to rush Barricade A which they did. In the meantime a report came in from Captain Mostyn Pryce saying that he had occupied the R B trench. After taking Barricade A fire was opened on us from Barricade B and the adjacent houses so I sent back for the next company under Lt Stoppard Sackville to attack Barricade B which they did and also cleared the houses.
Machine Gun fire was now opened from the mound and from another place which I cannot locate and also heavy rifle fire from Barricade D. Repeated efforts were made by individual officers and men to rush forward but the sting had gone out of the attack and it was very difficult to bring any more men up owing to the congestion on the road. I however sent back for the company left at Bus House and two companies of the K.S.L.I under Major Bayley 2/K.S.L.I reported to me. I ordered them to try and rush the mound. The reserve company which I sent back for could not get up owing to block on the road. It was now almost broad daylight and there was a confused mass of troops by the St. Eloi cross road and I decided, that as any continued rush appeared out of the question, to retire. A few men had worked round through the houses on both sides of the road but any organised advance on these lines were impossible owing to the debris and state of the ground. I consider that the failure of the attack on the mound was mainly down to the following causes.
- Want of accurate information owing to lack of time
- The impossibility of making any reconnaissance
- The fact that more than 50% of the Battalion is made up of men of the new army who are not sufficiently trained and disciplined to undertake such a difficult task as this proved to be.
War Diary 16th to 20th March 1915
16-3-15 - Dickiebusch: Working party digging trenches St. Eloi. One Sgt wounded. D Coy relieved in R.B. trench by D.C.L.I
17-3-15 - Dickiebusch: Working party digging trenches St. Eloi. One man wounded
18-3-15: Relieved 2/K.S.L.I in trenches
19-3-15: Trenches. Casualties 1 man killed and 4 wounded. Some trenches taken over by 2nd Royal Scots, 3rd Division
20-3-15: Relieved by 2/K.S.L.I in trenches. Casualties 1 killed and 2 wounded
War Diary 21st to 25th March 1915
21-3-15: Moved up to Voormozeele and Kruisstraathoek Chateau. 1 and a half Coys in each place. D Coy being left at Dickiebusch. Draft of 120 other ranks joined.
22-3-15: Relieved 2/K.S.L.I in trenches. 30 other ranks rejoined from composite Battalion at Boescnepe
23-3-15: Trenches. Casualties one man wounded. Very much less activity shown by the enemy than previously
24-3-15: Relieved by 7th Fusiliers, 3rd Division and marched back to billets about 1.5 miles SE of Poperinghe
25-3-15: Arrived in billets about 3.30am
