

WAR DIARY

or

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY.

(Erase heading not required.)

Army Form C.

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F. S. Regs., Part II, and the Staff Manual respectively. Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
In the pill.	3.5.14 (Contd).		A Coy will establish a block in trench which runs north from U.22.c.36. B Coy will also establish a block on other side of Sankin Road about U.21.d.4.7 and also a strong point at their junction with Sankin Road at U.21.d.5.6. Patrols will be pushed forward to the front. B Coy will dig posts in rear of final objective. 1 of B Coy platoons will carry R.E. material. B Coy will assist D and P Coy on their attack if required.	
- - -	4.5.14		2. Battalion Hd. Qrs. will be at C.2.d.9.9. 3. The Battalion Dressing Station will be behind the Embankment at C.2.b.1.9. The Battalion left the Railway cutting in U.26.c. at 12-30am on morning of 4.5.14 and was formed up on near top Railway line in U.24.c. at 1-30am. They moved from here to the attack at 3-10am. Companies moved from Railway cutting in U.26.c. to open ground N.E. of ECoust in C.2.b. under cover of Embankment. From here they moved forward by platoons to the line from where the advance was to take place. A conference was held on Operation Orders No.125, issued by 22nd Infy. Bde at 5-45pm 3.5.14, and the salient points, objectives of Companies and Boundaries were discussed and written down by O.C. Coy. Communication was maintained by 3 methods, viz:- 1. By Runners - With an advanced post at C.3.a.4.7. 2. By Signalling - A Visual Station was established at the Tank in front of BURSCOOT about U.24.d.2.3. and also a Receiving Station at C.2.d.5.9. During the heavy fire and bad visibility the men who carried antitank and reported at Battalion Hd. Qrs. at 5-30am. The Signalling lamp was also broken by Shell fire. 3. Pigeons - One pair was released and one pair died of Shell Shock. At 6 am. the Corporal in charge of Battalion Runners was sent forward to try and discover the positions and strength of Companies, also if possible to obtain written	ECoust - St Mein. Prop Reference:-

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Army Form C. 1. S.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
In the field 14.5.17 (Contd.)			microscope from officers. At 10 am the Sergeant in charge of Scouts and 2 men were sent to try and locate posts, find numbers of men, etc. in each position held by Germans. At 12.30 pm. Capt. W. J. Fowler, D.C. (Battalion Intelligence Officer) was sent forward and coordinated the statements brought back by Technicians and Scouts. They were sent position and changed of posts held in front of U.S. central area difficult to obtain. But at 4 pm. there were 20 men, 3 Lewis Guns and 2 Officers holding a line about U.S. central, and on the Railway embankment in U.S. 24, 40 men under N.C.O. Both these parties were digging in. There were also scattered posts of men unable to move owing to fire tank scattered about in shell holes between U.S. 24 central. Also 60 men had been collected and reformed at place ordered behind Railway embankment in C.2.a.9.9. After 2 pm. observations were as follows:- U.S. 24 central, a post of 3 Lewis Guns and 10 men. Dug in in front of Railway embankment, 20 officers and 100 other ranks. These were connected with 1st R.W. Bde on their left by a heavy gun post under a gap at U.S. 24.c.6.6. 120 other ranks were collected at C.2.a.9.9. Finding from these reports that both flanks of party in U.S. 24 were in the air, Lewis Guns and Snipers were pushed forward to guard flanks and gain touch with 1st R.W. Bde. At dusk the numbers of men on the embankment in U.S. 24 had been increased to 160 other ranks. Afterwards a party of 1 Lewis Gun and 15 other ranks came in who	Thruph ECOUT-ST MEN.

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Army Form C. 18.

Place	Date	Hour	Summary of Events and Information	Remarks and references to Appendices
In the field 15.5.14 (Contd.)			The strength of the Battalion going into action was:- 20 Officers, 609 Other Ranks. After the action the strength was 17 Officers, 342 Other Ranks. Only 3 minor opponents were left out of those who carried out the attack. The steps taken to re-organise and maintain the strength of the Battalion were as already stated and with certain points to stop any straggles and desertions, 1st Lt. H. J. P. and another at C. 2. 5. 6. 8. The positions of 1st Lt. P. and 1st Lt. J. during the attack were:- Battalion Headquarters were at C. 6. d. 9. 9. 1st Lt. P. moved forward with the attack, later in the day one was substituted on Railway line about U. 3. 1. 0. 3. Explanations as to cause of attack proving a failure:- 1. Concentration probably observed by enemy so he put down a heavy barrage at 3.30 am which had to be spread through. 2. Sudden alteration of plans which only allowed hurried consultation with Lt. C. 2. at 3.40 am on place of deployment. 3. Position held heavily by machine guns and second belt of wire in front of position. It appeared that the village was honeycombed with dug-outs and under-ground passages which allowed the enemy to get behind our men, 1 Sgt. described it like being in a maze. 5 The fact that the enemy outwitted us with his egg bombs. 6 The difficulty of obtaining information was very great owing to poor nature	Map Reference: E 20085 - St. Martin

